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1 Introduction
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework
and the agents’ decision problem. Values are characterized in Section 3.
Section 4 states the results. The Conclusions end the paper.
2 The environment
The framework of analysis is a modification of LW suited for the characteri-
zation of equilibria that feature an endogenous nominal interest rate.
Time is indexed by t ∈ N.
In each period t two markets open sequentially. The first market to open
is decentralized (DM), the second market is centralized (CM).
Agents
There is a closed unit interval [0, 1] of infinitely-lived agents, so that every
single agent is a set of zero Lebesgue measure (measure henceforth).
Every agent comes across the whole set of other agents, of which a subset
produce and sell appropriate special goods.
It is assumed that the set of special goods appropriate for a particular
buyer has α-measure for every agent, with 0 < α ≤ 1.
A setting with an heterogeneous distribution of measures, αi, of appro-
priate goods may be used too.
Buyers in the DM are anonymous. The exact sense of the term anonymous
is the subject of some debate...
What is meant by anonymity here is something that rules out trade credit,
so that transactions are subject to a quid pro quo restriction, which in turn
allows money to play a role as a medium of exchange (Kocherlakota [15] and
Wallace [24]).
It is assumed that the set of shop owners (sellers) is a subset of [0, 1] with
zero measure (e.g the set of shop owners may be assumed to coincide with
the Cantor ternary set.)
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When an agent comes across a good she demands, the same agent bargains
with another agent (the seller) in order to determine the terms of trade.
The terms of trade depend on the distribution of portfolios across shop
owners that sell specialized goods (e.g. the distribution of portfolios could
be a function on the Cantor ternary set.)
As the mapping from portfolios to agents is bijective, the distribution of
portfolios across agents induces a distribution of portfolios across goods for
sale.
This distribution is a step function with constant values on each α-
measure set of appropriate goods delivered by the same seller.
Special goods
A variety of goods is produced in the DM. Agents specialize in the pro-
duction of goods other from those they consume, so that autarky cannot be
an equilibrium.
Two distinct settings are sketched below that entail the same measure of
appropriate sellers and buyers for each agent i.
Specification A.
Assumption A.1) Every agent i specializes in the production of a single
good gi that is demanded by a zero-measure set agents.
For this to be the case, it suffices to impose that each good is demanded
by at most two agents even though assuming that each good is demanded by
a possibly infinite but still countable set is equivalent.
Accordingly, the measure of people buying the produced good is zero,
though the producer may even match a countable infinity of buyers.
As an example, let the set of specialized goods be G. Then, every agent
i ∈ [0, 1] demands a variety of goods Gi ⊂ G with Gi having α-measure.
Gi ∩ Gj is nonempty with zero measure for every i 6= j, i.e. tastes across
agents differ almost everywhere, and gi is not an element of Gi (⇒ no au-
tarky equilibrium.) This implies that no good is demanded by a set of agents
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with strictly positive measure and makes the analysis simpler with no loss of
generality.
It should be emphasized that this does not imply that if any set of goods
are demanded by a nonzero measure set of agents, then such a set of goods
must be zero measure.)
The (zero measure) set of buyers appropriate for seller i is denoted by Bi.
Hence,
Proposition 1. a1) the measure of buyers appropriate for each seller
i ∈ [0, 1] is m(Bi) = 0, while a2) the measure of sellers appropriate for each
buyer i ∈ [0, 1] is α.
a1) seems to capture Marx’s setting where producers demand money to
buy capital, a zero measure set of goods.
Does a1) imply that sellers in the DM are elements of a set distinct from
the set of buyers (with both selling labor in the CM)? No, as every agent
both specializes and demands goods.
Summing up, this specification says that
Proposition 1.2. The measure of purchases of a single agent in the DM
is α > 0 while the measure of a single agent’s sales is zero.
For example, this is the case if most agents (an α-measure set) work only
in the CM and buy specialized goods (produced by a zero measure set of
agents) in the DM (once a week) and general goods in the CM.
Think of people buying goods from few producers on the internet . . . think
of a village fair where lots of people go for a walk and buy from few sellers
. . .
Is this like people (it’d be better with like tastes) going to malls, with a
very small number of people demanding the same particular good?
As anticipated, portfolios can also be seen as distributed over special
goods (in addition to being distributed over agents), in the sense that port-
folios are constant over goods that are offered by the same shop owner. So
the distribution of portfolios over special goods may be a step function.
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Every agent demands an α-measure set of goods, and meets goods rather
than sellers. This can be seen as representative of the situation where agents
go to huge mall where lots of goods are offered by a relatively little number
of shop owners. In such a situation, the chances of a buyer coming across
goods she demands are not negligible, while the chances of a particular seller
being matched to a particular buyer are considerably fewer.
Specification B.
Assumption B.1) The measure of shop owners is zero.
Assumption B.2) Shop owners (sellers) demand goods from a zero mea-
sure set (contrasted with other agents who demand an α-measure set of
goods.)
Either B.1 and B.2 jointly, or
Assumption B.3) m(Gi ∩Gj) = 0 for every i 6= j,
along with
Assumption B.4) m(Gi) = α for every i ∈ [0, 1],
imply:
i) the measure of sellers meeting appropriate goods (in the DM) is zero,
and ii) the measure of buyers meeting appropriate (in the DM) goods is∫
[0,1]
m(Gi) =
∫
[0,1]
α = α.
Remark. Proposition 1.2 holds in this setting too.
Under the above assumptions, the measure of goods is
∑
i∈[0,1]
α =∞, while
in LW the measure of goods is 1.
This raises the question of where do those goods that are not produced
by any agent come from? [
⋃
i∈[0,1]
Gi] ∼ [0, 1] is a set of goods that exist in
nature (are primitive) and are owned by agents, e.g. different types of labor
abilities. Does it imply that the measure of shop producers-sellers be 1? Is
the Cantor ternary set (it has measure 0) an admissible counterexample?
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A convenient side effect of Proposition 1.2 is that value functions are
considerably simplified and the constraints on numerical simulations param-
eterized by α is less stringent (e.g. LW get an upper bound of 0.5 on σ, the
money velocity in the DM, which is related to α here).
It turns out that while the value of σ used in simulation by LW made no
difference, it does when it comes to simulate the nominal interest rate, i.e.
the nominal interest rate is very sensitive to α.
Special goods and assets
Special goods are non-storable and perish at the end of the DM, so that
the only assets that can be carried onto the CM are money and bonds. The
distribution of money and bonds across agents determines the distribution
of agents portfolios. The evolution of this distribution is outlined below.
The evolution of agents portfolios
The distribution of assets holdings Ft changes as a consequence of agents
trading.
At every round of decentralized trade, each seller is perfectly happy of
selling a good with market price equal to (1 + i)e in exchange for a 1e bond
as the bond is about to mature into (1 + i)e before any discounting occurs.
An agent entering the DM with (mt, bt) exits with (mt, bt)+dt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt)
in case of a single coincidence sale, and exits with (mt, bt)− dt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)
in case of a single coincidence purchase, with
dt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt) = dt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t) = (pν, p(1−ν)(1+it)−1), ν ∈ [0, 1] (1)
and
d : R4+ × N→ R2+ (2)
As a result, after DM trade agents portfolios are on simplices with extreme
points (mt+p, bt) and (mt, bt+p(1+ it)
−1), and p = 0 for agents who weren’t
involved in any single coincidence meeting.
This maps Ft to F
DM
t .
After bonds mature, agents portfolios are of the type (mt + νp + (1 −
ν)p+ bt(1 + it), 0), and p = 0 in case of no single coincidence meeting.
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This maps FDMt to F
b
t .
Before entering the CM agents allocate the amount of money mt + νp+
(1− ν)p+ bt(1 + it) between money and bonds, (mt+ , bt+), to carry onto the
CM.
This maps F bt to Ft+.
Once in the CM an agent with (mt+ , bt+) chooses (m
′, b′)(mt+ + bt+) =
(mt+1, bt+1).
Agents trade assets in the CM in such a way that (mt+1, bt+1) is indepen-
dent of (mt+ + bt+), i.e. neither the value nor the composition of portfolios
matters, and (m′, b′) is a constant.
Moreover, bonds cannot be exchanged for anything in the CM, so that
bt+1 = bt+ (3)
This maps F bt into Ft again.
Preferences in the DM
Agents enjoy utility u (q) from q consumption in the DM, where u′ (q) > 0,
u′′ (q) < 0, u′ (0) =∞, and u′ (∞) = 0.
Furthermore, the elasticity of utility η (q) = qu′ (q) /u (q) is bounded by
assumption.
Producers incur a utility cost (a disutility) c (q) from producing q units
of output with c′ (q) > 0 and c′′ (q) ≥ 0.
Let q∗ denote the solution to u′ (q∗) = c′ (q∗).
Preferences in the CM
A single good is produced in the CM instead.
In the CM all agents consume and produce, enjoying utility U (x) from
x units of consumption, with U ′ (x) > 0, U ′ (0) = ∞, U ′ (∞) = 0 and
U ′′ (x) ≤ 0.
The same consumption can be produced from labor by each agent using
a linear technology.
This implies that no wealth effects drive demand for money in the CM.
Hence, money demand is also independent of trading histories.
Agents discount only between time t-CM and time t+ 1-DM.
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This is not restrictive since as in Rocheteau and Wright [21] all that
matters is the total discounting between successive periods.
Bonds
As in Zhu and Wallace [25], there are one-period, risk-free assets issued
by the government.
In particular, the government uses vending machines to sell bonds in
exchange for money. The vending machines feature a record-keeping tech-
nology such that they can observe the owner’s name and address printed on
the certificate.
It is assumed that b ∈ R+, so that individuals can invest but not borrow1.
Agent types and endowments
All bonds automatically turn into money right after decentralized trade
has taken place.
Then agents can invest time t-money holdings into the risk-free asset b
bearing the (to be determined under equilibrium) gross nominal rate of return
1 + i.
In principle, exchange of goods for bonds may take place in the CM too.
If it does not, then the distribution of bonds across agents is conveniently
tractable. So, as a preliminary setup, bonds are are assumed to be illiquid
in the CM. This may be the case if, e.g., bonds can be costlessly counterfeit,
and counterfeits automatically perish after they change hand.
This in turn requires something like the technology for detecting coun-
terfeits is available in the DM so that sellers do not fear accepting bonds in
transactions.
As a result bonds are endogenously partially liquid and money is not
the only medium of exchange.
Restrictions on bond circulation have been introduced also in [1], [7] and
[8]. An exhaustive discussion of illiquid bonds is in [16].
Money supply
A central bank exists that controls the money supply at time t, Mt > 0.
1Frameworks in which agents can either lend or borrow are in Berentsen, Camera and
Waller [4] and Berentsen and Waller [6].
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Money supply transforms according to Mt = γMt−1. γ ∈ R+ is a constant
and new money is injected, or withdrawn if γ < 1, through transfers piMt−1 =
(γ − 1)Mt−1 to agents.
Money transfers are lump-sum (i.e. they do not depend on agents’ behav-
ior). We restrict attention to policies where γ ≥ β, with β ∈ (0, 1) denoting
the discount factor.
Agents receive lump-sum money transfers pib at the opening of DM trade.
Let pibMt−1 = piMt−1/ (1− n) be the per agent money transfer.
The timing of events is shown in Figure 1.
Stationary equilibria
The analysis is devoted to stationary equilibria characterized by
φM = φ−1M−1 (4)
which implies that φ−1/φ = M/M−1 = γ, and aggregate real money balances
are constant.
In period t, let φt = 1/Pt denote the real price of money and Pt the price
of goods in the CM.
The Fisher equation does not necessarily hold, hence the equivalence of
either setting the nominal interest rate or the inflation rate is not granted.
Right after trade of goods has occurred (and before the CM opens), agents
have the opportunity to invest their money in nominal bonds.
Interest payments are financed by lump-sum taxes levied by the govern-
ment at the end of decentralized trade.
As interest on bonds is paid right after taxes are collected and before
new bonds are sold, interest payments cannot be financed through new bond
emissions.
Hence, the government budget constraint expressed in nominal terms is
Btit = Tt (5)
where Bt is the government debt outstanding at the beginning of time t-CM,
and Tt is a lump-sum nominal tax.
Equation (2) states that the interest payment, Btit, on bonds is financed
by tax revenues. Tax revenues depend on the (to be determined) equilibrium
interest rate it.
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So demand for bonds may affect the amount of taxes that need to be col-
lected, which may disincentive people from investing in bonds. Furthermore,
each agent’s demand for bonds is zero measure so that nobody is able to
exert a non-negligible effect on the amount taxes required to finance interest
payment. Hence, no agent can affect the equilibrium nominal interest rate.
3 Values
Aggregate variables enter individual maximization problems as fixed param-
eters.
Agents decisions are then implied by (common) VFs with money and
bond holdings, m and b, as the only arguments.
Let V (mt, bt) denote the expected value from trading in the DM with mt
money balances and bt units of nominal bonds.
Let W (mt+ , bt+) denote the expected value from entering the CM with
mt+ units of money and bt+ units of nominal bonds.
It is convenient to sequentially characterize equilibria within a single pe-
riod starting from the CM.
Centralized market max problems
In the CM agents produce h units of good using h hours of labor, consume
x, and adjust their money balances.
Bonds do not mature and cannot be exchanged among agents in the CM.
The real wage per hour is normalized to one.
Discounting explicitly appears in values, Ws, calculated in CMs as they
include next period’s values, V+1s.
No agent accepts bonds as a means of payment in the CM. Hence, if
any exchange for bonds were to take place that would have to be a portfo-
lio adjustment between sellers. For ease of analysis this possibility is ruled
out. In other words, the distribution of bonds across agents is unaffected by
activities taking place in the CM.
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3.1 Representative agent’s CM problem
There is no dependence of either V or W on t. The notation mt+1 stands for
money holdings carried onto next DM.
Notice that mˆ1,+1 denotes (m1,+1, b1,+1).
The representative agent’s problem at the beginning of the CM
W
(
mt+ , bt+
)
= max
x,h,mt+1
[U (x)− h+ βV (mt+1, bt+1)] (6)
such that
−h = −x+ φ (mt+ −mt+1) (7)
with x ∈ R+, h, 0 ∈ H a connected closed and bounded subset of R+,
and mt+1 ∈ R+ denoting the money taken into period t+ 1.
For money demand to be degenerate in the CM, it is sufficient that util-
ity from either labor supply or consumption be linear. Following LW, it is
assumed that utility is a linear function of labor supply, h.
Eliminate −h from (6) using (7) and get
W
(
mt+ , bt+
)
= max
x,mt+1
[
U (x)− x+ φt
(
mt+ −mt+1
)
+ βV (mt+1, bt+1)
]
(8)
or
W
(
mt+ , bt+
)
= φtmt+ + max
x,mt+1
[U (x)− x− φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1, bt+1)] (9)
with
V (mt+1, bt+1) = V (mt+1, 0) + αu(q˜(bt+1)) (10)
where
V (mt+1, 0) (11)
is utility from buying with money,
The distribution of quantities of appropriate goods purchased with bonds
as a medium of payment is assumed to be independent of goods, i.e. it is
flat across goods. Denote by q(gi, bt+1) the quantity of good gi purchased
by the agent given her portfolio composition (hence her holdings of bonds).
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Depending on mt+1, different levels of bt+1 may entail the same distribution
of q(gi, bt+1) across Gi. For ease of analysis, the distribution is assumed to
depend only on bt+1. Then, total utility gained from exchanges accomplished
by use of bonds is given by∫
Gi
{u[q(gi, bt+1)]} = αu[q(gi, bt+1)] (12)
Let the constant value of q(gi, bt+1) be denoted by q˜(bt+1). Then
αu(q˜(bt+1)) (13)
is the additional measure of utility accrued from consuming the quantity
q˜(bt+1) purchased across the α-measure of appropriate sellers, using the quan-
tity bt+1 of bonds as a medium of payment. The quantity q˜(bt+1) should be
equal to q˜(bt+1(1+i)e), i.e. the quantity purchased using quantity bt+1(1+i)e
coins as means of payment. It is worth emphasizing that the quantity q˜(bt+1)
is zero measure, and the marginal utility from using an additional unit of
bonds as medium of payment is αu′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1), while the marginal utility
from using one additional euro coin as means of payment is
Comment. Equilibria with q˜(bt+1) : u(q˜(bt+1)) = 1⇒
∫
Gi
{u[q(gi, bt+1)]} =
1 could be easier to analyze.
The first order conditions with respect to x and mt+1 are
U ′ (x∗) = 1 (14)
βVmt+1(mt+1, bt+1) = φt (15)
where the βVmt+1(mt+1, bt+1) is the seller’s marginal benefit of taking money
out of the CM and φ is its marginal cost.
Equation (14) characterizes the optimal consumption level x∗.
Equation (15) shows that mt+1 is independent of bt and mt, i.e. the
distribution of money holdings across sellers is degenerate at the beginning
of the next period because the quasi-linearity assumption on preferences rules
out wealth effects on money demand in the CM.
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Agents who bring too much cash into the CM spend some buying goods,
while those carrying too little sell goods.
Envelopes and no arbitrage
Rather, agents adjust money holdings in the CM so as to exploit arbitrage
opportunities as below.
Equations (9) and (3) imply the envelope conditions
Wmt+ = φt (16)
Wbt+ = βVbt+1(mt+1, bt+1) (17)
No arbitrage between money and bonds is given by the condition
φt = βVbt+1(mt+1, bt+1) (18)
stating that at the margin no utility gain can be attained from using
either medium of exchange.
Notice that (18) is not any agent’s decision rule, it is an equilibrium
condition that may hold even if i > 0.
Combining the efficiency condition (15) of money allocation in the CM
with the no arbitrage equation (18), it follows that
Vmt+1(mt+1, bt+1) = Vbt+1(mt+1, bt+1) (19)
with
Vbt+1(mt+1, bt+1) = αu
′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1) (20)
by (10).
Hence,
Vmt+1(mt+1, bt+1) = αu
′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1) (21)
i.e. the cost of holding money is equated to the (to be derived) measure
of marginal utility from carrying bonds onto next DM.
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This reads also as
Vmt+1(mt+1, bt+1)
u′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1)
= α (22)
i.e. the equilibrium SMS (relative price?) between money and bonds is
equal to the measure of goods demanded by agent i in the DM.
In equilibrium, the marginal utility from bonds is greater than that from
money because bonds ensure an interest return in addition to acting as a
means of payment.
Bonds are more valued than money because if in the next DM I have a
bad luck meeting an appropriate seller, bonds make me earn a return anyway
that protects me from the inflation tax, while if I am just holding money and
can’t spend it, then I am bound to pay the inflation tax on all of my wealth.
Remark. αu′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1) is the marginal utility of one additional euro of
bonds, and will be determined in Section 3.4.
3.2 DMs
In the DM agents are allowed to barter, exchange specialized goods for money,
and exchange specialized goods for bonds.
Let qb and qs denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced
by a seller trading in the DM, respectively.
Agents may not find it optimal to carry entire portfolios to the market as
this may reduce bargaining power, but this possibility will not be considered
in what follows to simplify the analysis.
Let p be the nominal price of goods in the DM.
As anticipated, an agent carrying the portfolio (mt, bt) to the DM exits
with (mt, bt) + dt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt) in case of a single coincidence sale of the
quantity qt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt) to a buyer carrying the portfolio (m˜t, b˜t), and exits
with (mt + bt) − dt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t) in case of a single coincidence purchase of
the quantity qt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t) from a seller carrying the portfolio (m˜t, b˜t).
Denote by V (mt, bt) the value of entering the DM with portfolio (mt, bt).
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Then, under either Specification A or Specification B, each agent i ∈ [0, 1]
chooses a portfolio so as to maximize∫
Gi
{u[q] +W − d}+
∫
Bi
{−ν[q] +W + d} (23)
Hence, the value function can be written as
V (mt, bt) =
max
mt,bt
{α
∫
{u[qt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)] +W [(mt + bt)− dt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]}dFt(m˜t, b˜t)
+m(Gi)
∫
{−ν[qt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)] +W [(mt + bt) + dt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt)]}dFt(m˜t, b˜t)
+ (1− α)W (mt, bt)} (24)
where Ft(m˜t, b˜t) denotes the (induced by sellers specialization) distribu-
tion of portfolios across the α-measure set of goods appropriate for agent
(buyer) i, and m(Gi) = 0 is the measure of buyers appropriate for agent i.
The first term is . . . (1− α) is the measure . . .
Assume that
W [(mt + bt)− dt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)] = W [(mt + bt)]− φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t) (25)
and
W [(mt + bt) + dt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt)] = W [(mt + bt)] + φdt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt) (26)
Then (24) reduces to the simpler form
V (mt, bt) =
max
mt,bt
{α
∫
{u[qt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]− φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)}dFt(m˜t, b˜t)
+W (mt, bt)} (27)
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LW get rid of this integral because the money the buyer pays is inde-
pendent of the seller’s money holdings (this makes the distribution of money
irrelevant but may not be realistic in some cases.)
In other words, the zero measure of sellers jointly with the independence
of the money payment on the seller’s money holdings (and, different from
LW, no chances of bartering) give the following value
V (mt, bt) =
max
mt,bt
{α{u[qt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]− φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)}
+W (mt, bt)} (28)
3.2.1 Bargaining
In the Nash problem
max
q,dt(mt,bt,m˜t,b˜t),dt(mt,bt,m˜t,b˜t)
[u(q)−φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]θ[−ν(q)+φdt(m˜t, b˜t,mt, bt)]1−θ
(29)
what the buyer pays is equal to what the seller gets, so that
max
q,dt(mt,bt,m˜t,b˜t)
[u(q)− φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]θ[−ν(q) + φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)]1−θ (30)
Assume θ = 1 so that the above problem simplifies to
max
q,dt(mt,bt,m˜t,b˜t)
[u(q)− φdt(mt, bt, m˜t, b˜t)] (31)
The solution depends both on the degree of mildness of disutility from
labor and on whether the budget constraint binds.
If disutility is mild enough and the constraint binds the solution is char-
acterized by
u′(q) > 0, λb > 0 (32)
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with λb denoting the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer’s budget con-
straint, and trade is inefficient. Otherwise, u′(q) must equate the utility cost
of giving money up.
Is this expressed by
u′(q) = φ (33)
?
If the answer is yes, assume u(q) = ln(q) so that
q∗ = φ−1 (34)
so that the terms of trade are (φ−1, φ), i.e. the quantity φ−1 is exchanged
at the utility price φ of a unit of money (equivalently, for a unit of money).
If there is no disutility from labor, then the quantity produced and ex-
changed is efficient, and so d = (m∗, b∗) = (mt, bt), where (m∗, b∗) is the least
amount of assets (money and bonds) sufficient to induce the seller to produce
and offer the quantity q∗.
If the answer is no, consumer equilibrium is given by
u′(q) = φp (35)
Assuming p = 1, it follows that
q∗ = φ−1 = 1 (36)
and the terms of trade reduce to (q∗, p) = (1, 1), i.e. the quantity 1 is
exchanged at the utility price 1 of a unit of money (equivalently, for a unit
of money).
Again, if there is no disutility from labor, then the quantity produced
and exchanged is efficient, and so d = (m∗, b∗) = (mt, bt), where (m∗, b∗) is
the least amount of assets (money and bonds) sufficient to induce the seller
to produce and offer the quantity q∗ = 1.
The value (28) becomes
V (mt, bt) = α(ln[1]− 1) +W (mt+ , bt+) (37)
or
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V (mt, bt) = −α +W (mt+ , bt+) (38)
Assume linear utility in the CM, U(x) = x, and use (8) to get
V (mt, bt) = −α + max
(mt+1,bt+1)
{φtmt+ − φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1, bt+1)} (39)
where φ(mt+ −mt+1) is the value of money inside next period portfolio
net of the cost of acquiring it, and (3) implies maximization only w.r.t. mt+1.
The term ν0(s) in LW2002 is zero hero.
Hence,
V (mt, bt) = −α + max
mt+1
{φtmt+ − φtmt+1 + βV (mt+1, bt+1)} (40)
Repeated substitution gives
V (mt, bt) = −α + φtmt+ +
∞∑
j=t
βj−tmax
mj+1
{−φjmj+1 + β[νj+1(mj+1, bj+1) + φj+1mj+1]}(41)
where νj+1(mj+1, bj+1) depends on bj+1 because of the medium of ex-
change role played by bonds carried onto next DM.
or
V (mt, bt) = −α + φtmt+ +
∞∑
j=t
βj−tmax
mj+1
{mj+1(βφj+1 − φj} (42)
This is simpler than LW as we got rid of their νt+1 which depended on
Ft+1, νt+1(Ft+1). So there is no dependence of the sequence of m
′
js on Ft+1
(LW say it only influences the intercept of the VF and not the mt+1).
V (mt, bt) is linear in mj+1. If βφj+1−φj > 0, i.e. βφj+1 > φj or φj+1φj > 1β ,
then there is no solution to the problem of choosing mt+1. . . why? Is the no-
arbitrage condition of help?
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Looks like equilibrium requires βφj+1 < φj as in LW. Does it imply that
the optimal mt+1 is zero and agents only hold bonds? Yes it implies m
∗
t+1 = 0.
Don’t know if bonds are positive.
Notice that LW characterize monetary equilibrium by any path for {qt+1}
satisfying mt+1 < m
∗
t+1 (LW, p. 472).
If φj+1 = φj as, given bt+ , eq. (21) suggests (this holds also because of
Lemma 3 in LW2002) . . . then βφj+1 < φj holds and m
∗
t+1 = 0. If so, then
V (mt, bt) = −α + φtmt+ .
Whose hands the money spent in the CM goes? As nobody is carrying
any money into next DM, everybody must be spending the whole of money
holdings (including money injection which takes place at the beginning of
the CM).
Hence, agents find it optimal to maximize the value of their portfolios
and the portfolio constraint always binds. As a consequence, neither the
equilibrium demand for money nor for bonds can be zero. Hence, money and
bonds coexist? Even though agents try to substitute money for bonds . . .
. . .
General bargaining solution
The general solution characterized by LW consists of the seller spending
the dt(m, m˜) = min(mt,m
∗).
If mt = min(mt,m
∗) then the buyer gets qt(m, m˜) = q˜t(m) ≤ q∗.
If m∗ = min(mt,m∗) the cash constraint is not binding and the buyer gets
qt(m, m˜) = q
∗ (and eventually disposes or what of excess money holdings?)
(This consists of either the seller exchanging all of his money holdings
(dt(m, m˜) = m) for a quantity weakly less than the efficient level qt(m, m˜) =
q˜t(m) ≤ q∗ (ifmt ≤ m∗ withm∗ denoting the least amount of money sufficient
to buy q∗), or the buyer giving all of her money holdings (dt(m, m˜) = m <
m∗t ) up for a lesser quantity (mt < m
∗ and the budget constraint is binding.))
Hence, in LW the solution to the bargaining problem only depends on the
buyer’s money holdings mt and I cannot get any discount from a starving
seller!
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Remark. The LW solution to the bargaining problem⇒ the buyer cannot
get any utility from money in excess of m∗ ⇒ ν ′t+1(mt+1) = 0 for all mt+1 ≥
m∗t+1. ⇒ any equilibrium must satisfy φt ≥ βφt+1.
If bonds allow buyers to get utility from that extra cash, will the minimum
inflation rate consistent with equilibrium still be the Freidman rule? see LW
p. 471.
Let agents with more than m∗ lend to those with less. This should be
welfare improving as more people consume closer to (at) the efficient level.
There is a role for credit with no banks, no government, and no ex-post
heterogeneity!
Is m∗t+1 = m
∗?
The bargaining solution can be used to simplify the value function (24).
. . .
3.3 Compare monetary bargaining to monetary plus
bonds bargaining
Portfolio composition matters
Imagine sellers prefer money, but may consider accepting complementary
(in addition to money) assets in exchange for goods in case the buyer money
holdings are short of m∗.
In this case, different from LR, is not the total value of portfolios that
matters, but the composition too is of importance.
What if mt = min(mt,m
∗) and m∗ ≤ mt + bt(1 + it)−1, i.e. m∗ =
min(mt + bt(1 + it)
−1,m∗)?
In this case, the seller has an incentive to accept bonds at a discount and
the buyer has an incentive to use bonds to pay for the efficient quantity.
For instance, it may either happen that the seller gets min(mt + bt(1 +
it)
−1,m∗) for q∗, or that the buyer gets q∗ for may get min(mt+bt(1+ it)−1−
,m∗).
20
Does subsidization of bond payments emerge? . . .
3.4 The equilibrium nominal interest rate
Lagos and Rocheteau give agents periodic access to asset markets so as to
allow for competition between real and nominal assets. The present setting
departs from theirs in that competition is allowed for between nominal assets
(rather than real assets) as means of payment (instead of stores of value.)
Portfolio composition does not matter
As sellers are indifferent between 1e cash and (1 + i)−1 e bond, the
buyer fully appropriates for the returns exchange using bonds provides. Such
returns equal the utility accrued from investing (1 + i)−1e coins in bonds
and transforming the bonds back to 1e cash (which includes the interest
payment) upon bargaining. Hence, the quantity used to evaluate such returns
is the quantity resulting from the bargaining solution (equation (36).) Then,
utility from buying in the next DM using a 1e bond as medium of payment
must be
αu′(q˜)q˜′(bt+1) = φ(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1u′(q(b)) (43)
as the seller evaluates this as the same as (1 + i)e coins.
In particular, (1 + i)e is the (monetary) before inflation tax return of 1e
coin invested in bonds.
(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1e (pi is a pure number) is the (monetary) return of 1e
coin invested in bonds net of the inflation tax.
φ(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1 (the unit of measure of φ is e) is the real (purchasing-
power, i.e. in terms of maximum amount of goods that can be purchased in
the next DM) return of 1e coin invested in bonds.
φ(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1u′(q(b)) is the return of 1e coin invested in bonds mea-
sured in utils.
Such return is affected by monetary policy as the equality γ = (1 + pi)
holds in equilibrium.
Hence, equation (22) gives
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Vmt+1(mt+1, bt+1)
φ(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1u′(q(b))
= 1 (44)
which, using equation (15), becomes
φβ−1
φ(1 + i)(1 + pi)−1u′(q(b))
= 1 (45)
or
(1 + i) =
φβ−1
φu′(q(b))
(46)
The trading solution (36) gives
(1 + i) = φβ−1(1 + pi) (47)
or
(1 + i) =
(1 + pi)
β
(48)
or
it =
(1 + pi)
β
− 1 (49)
which is the equilibrium nominal interest rate.
If every meeting is a single coincidence, then
it =
(1 + pi)
β
− 1 (50)
Taking account of (1 + iR) = β
−1, this can be rewritten as
(1 + it) = (1 + pi)(1 + iR) (51)
which is the Fisher equation.
So that the Fisher equation holds in an economy with nominal bonds and
no (frictions due to) absence of single coincidence.
If instead I use c(q) = q so that u′(q(b)) = c′(q(b)) = 1, the same result
obtains.
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In general, using β = 1
1+iR
,
(1 + it) = (1 + pi)(1 + iR) (52)
and
it = (1 + pi)(1 + iR)− 1 (53)
follow.
In words, the equilibrium nominal interest rate exceeds (is short of) the
values predicted by the Fisher equation if every agent demands a set of goods
with measure less (more) than 1. The equilibrium interest rate is equal to
the values from the Fisher equation iff the measure of goods demanded by
every agent is equal to 1, which in the present setting is also the measure of
agents.
In particular, the nominal interest rate is negative when α > (1 + pi)(1 +
iR), which requires either a deflation or a set of appropriate sellers with
measure (α) larger than the set of agents (which is 1, but may be zero if
agents are elements of the Cantor ternary set.) Is there any evidence of
negative nominal interest rates, positive values from the Fisher equation
notwithstanding? Such cases should encompass examples with deflation as,
according to the Fisher equation, negative nominal rates should be caused
by deflation. I.e., unless I have deflation, I cannot have negative nominal
interest rates if the Fisher equation holds.
Moreover, here negative interest rates are possible under no arbitrage
equilibrium (see [2], p. 2).
“Indeed, negative nominal rates are deemed impossible in equilibrium be-
cause they afford an arbitrage, and the absence of arbitrage is normally con-
sidered an equilibrium condition that is required for market clearing.”([2]).
What is this arbitrage? Here negative nominal interest rates may emerge
under no arbitrage, which is the condition that determines the endogenous
equilibrium nominal interest rate.
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Do negative rates act (as is the case in [2]) as a 100% tax on nominal
wealth (i.e. bonds plus cash?)?
Probably, the uniqueness of equilibrium proven by Wright (if the result
extends here) rules out any problem of strict implementation, i.e. adoption
of policy rules that avoid the existence of equilibria different from the desired
one.
How comes the government is paid as a borrower (the nominal interest
rate is negative)? Bargaining involves the purchase of a good out of an α-
measure set of goods. When α is sufficiently larger than 1, the variety of
goods outnumbers the number of agents by far. The chances of sellers selling
a sufficiently large measure of goods are little. This captures the idea of an
“insufficient equilibrium-aggregate demand”. Hence, sellers may be willing
to subsidize agents’ purchases (this may apply in particular to primitive and
perishable goods) as a way of minimizing losses (this is somehow related to
taxation of inelastically supplied labor). Subsidization may be allowed for
by sellers accepting bonds as a means of payment, with subsidization in the
form of a premium on bond payments, which is equivalent to discounting
bonds at a negative nominal interest rate.
4 Quantitative analysis
In LW iR = 0.04, take inflation data for pi and compute series for it parame-
terized by α ∼= 1 and according to eq. (53).
How do I choose α? Maybe I should try to find the α that best fits the
relationship between the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate.
A simple way of estimating α consists of taking the data with monthly
frequency, take the monthly real interest rate, and calculate the monthly α’s.
Then make an average and take it as an estimate.
Take α as a deep parameter and use the estimated value to check if it is
consistent with negative nominal rates when they occurred. They observed
rates should be negative when pi ≤ −iR because the perturbed Fisher equa-
tion gives this as a sufficient condition.
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Best fit in what sense? Lucas (2002) fits are choices among members of
a parametric family (i.e. a finite number) of functions.
Remarks on graph 2. I guess that the variability in F est cannot be
present in the CPN3M because that is the interest rate in what are contracts
not indexed on inflation, and so it is less sensitive to monthly changes on
yearly inflation.
Is a moving average of NF est more appropriate? Of course not, as the
equilibrium nominal interest rate has to compensate agents for the inflation
tax.
F est compensates as well, but it overpredicts values by a large amount
all over the time period considered.
The NF est fit is very good from around July 2000 until July 2002. Its
global overprediction is way less.
Check if this is a result of the FED pegging the TB to CPI.
CPN3M seems to have not been incorporating inflation until around August
2007. If this is correct, then the volatility of CPI seems to be a cost for
those who have been lending money through CPN3M contracts (and a gain
from January 1997 until around July 2000, a period during which inflation
displayed less volatility).
FED cuts of TB are likely to have resulted in subsidization of indebted
agents as, e.g., those who are paying mortgages, and of public debt servicing.
Is there any instance when equilibrium nominal rates are negative? It
would be worth trying to estimate Japan deflation and “liquidity trap”.
5 Conclusions
To be added.
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